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Taxation Without Representation: The Judicial Usurpation of
the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins
Over thirty-five years ago in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause mandated the integration of public schools. In formulating remedies for
public school integration, the district courts' equitable powers have been exceed-
ingly broad. In contrast, the Supreme Court has noted "[t]hat the power to tax
involves the power to destroy. ' 2 The power to tax traditionally has been re-
served for the politically accountable legislative branch. Any imposition of a tax
by the independent, life-tenured federal judiciary consistently has been viewed as
a violation of both separation of powers and the principle of federalism. 3
In Missouri v. Jenkins,4 the Supreme Court addressed whether a district
court's broad equitable powers to desegregate school systems include the power
to impose a property tax directly upon local constituents, even though the tax
would violate state law. The Court reversed the district court's direct imposition
of a property tax, but held that the lower court had the power to compel the
legislature to impose such a tax.5 The Jenkins majority6 ruled that the district
court could enjoin state law limitations on property tax increases, empowering
the local legislature to raise the tax.7 The majority reasoned that there is a sub-
tle yet pivotal constitutional difference between a district court's direct imposi-
tion of a property tax and a judicial order compelling the local legislature to
impose the same tax.8
This Note begins with a discussion of the history of the Jenkins litigation in
the federal courts, culminating in the recent Supreme Court decision. The Note
then traces the history of the equitable powers vested in the district courts to
effectuate school desegregation. Subsequently, the Note examines a separate line
of cases addressing the propriety of judicially compelled taxation. After outlin-
ing these two separate lines of cases, the Note evaluates the Jenkins Court's
ruling in light of these precedents and concludes that the majority's rationale
amounts to nothing more than a chimerical distinction. Because the majority's
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). McCulloch was a landmark
case involving the State of Maryland's improper exercise of the power to tax. The Court held that
Congress had the power to establish a national bank, but that individual states did not possess the
power to tax the federal government. Id. at 424, 436. The Court reasoned that the federal govern-
ment could tax the states because they were represented in Congress. Id. at 435. Because the federal
government had no representation in state legislatures, however, the Court held that it was improper
for the states to impose a tax on the federal banks. Id. at 435-36.
3. See infra note 118 (citing cases).
4. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
5. Id. at 1663.
6. Justice White wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Part II, and for the majority in
Parts I, III, and IV, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at
1655.
7. Id. at 1666.
8. See id. at 1666-67.
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distinction is merely specious, the Note asserts that the Court's ruling unconsti-
tutionally infringes on the fundamental principles of separation of powers and
federalism. The Note then discusses the possibility of the detrimental extension
of the holding to other areas where the courts have broad equitable powers. The
Note concludes by proffering a solution that attempts to avoid the constitutional
infractions and negative ramifications of the Jenkins Court's ruling.
In 1977, the Kansas City Missouri School District ("KCMSD") and stu-
dents from within the district filed a complaint against the State of Missouri and
the districts surrounding KCMSD, alleging that the defendants were operating a
segregated school system.9 Even though KCMSD originally had filed suit, the
district court realigned it as a co-defendant in the action.'0 After trial on the
merits of the students' claim, the district court found that KCMSD and the
State of Missouri had operated an intradistrict segregated school system.'I
In a subsequent hearing, the district court focused its attention on prescrib-
ing appropriate remedies and the financing necessary to fund them.12 The court
apportioned the costs at approximately seventy-five percent and twenty-five per-
cent for the State and KCMSD, respectively.' 3 The district court concluded,
however, that several provisions of Missouri state law prevented KCMSD from
9. School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (holding that students
stated claim for relief, realigning KCMSD as a party defendant, and dismissing other defendants for
lack of jurisdiction), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979) (dismissing action as not appeal-
able because alignment of KCMSD was a collateral issue and all defendants were not dismissed),
related reference, Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that State and
KCMSD had operated a segregated intradistrict school system), related reference, Jenkins v. Mis-
souri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (issuing original order delineating remedies necessary to
eliminate segregation, and enjoining state law in order to provide KCMSD with additional funds to
finance its portion of costs), aff'd as modified, Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th
Cir. 1986) (generally affirming district court's remedial plan but ordering court to apportion costs
equally among defendants), related reference, Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo.
1987) (finding no alternative, district court directly increased property tax to finance KCMSD's
portion of the desegregation remedy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri,
855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's direct imposition of tax, but ordering the
court to enjoin state law and authorize KCMSD to levy tax itself in the future), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (reversing district court's imposition of a direct tax,
but affirming appellate court's alternate solution). The history of this case, as this citation indicates,
is complicated, confusing, and somewhat convoluted. To avoid confusion in the remainder of the
Note, the subsequent history of lower court cases cited in future footnotes will not be indicated. As
an alternative to such repetitious citation, this footnote gives a comprehensive prior history and
should be used as a cross reference when necessary.
10. School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 442 (W.D. Mo. 1978). KCMSD subsequently
filed a cross-claim for indemnification from the State for any liability that it might incur from a
finding of segregation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
11. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The court, however, found
no continuing interdistrict segregation and dismissed the claims against the surrounding school dis-
tricts. Id. at 1488. The court had bifurcated the liability issue from the remedial measure and
consequently did not address a potential remedy at this hearing. Id.
12. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 22-23 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
13. Id. at 43-44. The plan originally was estimated to cost $88,000,000. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later ruled that the district court had not given
adequate justification for apportioning the costs and ordered the lower court to divide the costs
equally. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 685 (8th Cir. 1986) (en bane). On remand, the district
court determined that the doctrine of comparative fault supported its original ruling and held the
tortfeasors jointly and severally liable to ensure plenary funding of the remedy. Missouri v. Jenkins,
110 S. Ct. 1651, 1657 (1990) (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 113a (1987)).
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raising funds to pay its portion of the costs of the desegregation plan.14
The principal obstacle to raising the funds was a Missouri constitutional
limit on local property taxes. This constitutional restraint limited property taxes
to $1.25 per $100 of assessed valuation, unless a majority of the voters approved
an increase of up to $3.75 per $100; any increase beyond $3.75 required the
approval of two-thirds of the voting constituency. 15 Another obstacle to the
court's remedy was the "Hancock Amendment" which required property tax
rates to be decreased to match any increase in revenue resulting from a property
value reassessment.16 This amendment, therefore, precluded the possibility of
increasing tax revenues from reassessing property values. The final obstacle was
"Proposition C," which established a common trust fund for state education,
but had the effect of channeling almost half of the sales tax collected in KCMSD
to other parts of Missouri. 17
In an attempt to fund KCMSD's portion of the remedies, the district court
enjoined Proposition C to permit KCMSD to retain all of its sales tax.18 Fur-
thermore, the court ordered KCMSD to proffer to the voters a tax increase suffi-
cient to fund the cost of desegregation.1 9 When the local constituents rejected
the proposed tax increase, the court once again enjoined the operation of Propo-
sition C.20
After approving expansive additional remedial measures, 2 ' the district
court concluded that KCMSD had "exhausted all available means of raising
additional revenue."'22 Accordingly, the court ruled that it had "no choice but
to exercise its broad equitable powers and enter a judgment that ... [would]
enable the KCMSD to raise its share of the cost of the plan."' 23 The court then
ordered the KCMSD property tax to be raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of
assessment value.24
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the scope of the
remedy, the allocation of costs, and the denial of intervention by a group of local
14. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 44 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
15. Mo. CONsT. art. X, § 1 l(b), (c); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1312 (8th Cir.
1988) (detailing effect of provision on the case).
16. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 22(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.073 (Supp. 1990).
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 164.013.1 (Supp. 1990).
18. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 45 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
19. Id.
20. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1657 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 13842 (1987)).
21. In addition to the original estimate of the cost of desegregation, the court continued to
approve new extensive remedial measures in the same proceedings in which it was attempting to
finance KCMSD's portion of these costs. For example, the district court, upon the request of the
"defendant" KCMSD, eventually approved the adoption of a "magnet school" program. Id. "Mag-
net schools" are designed to integrate a school system through a program of voluntary enrollment
combined with unusual curriculum and increased quality. See id. at 1657 n.6. This program was
estimated to cost $142,736,025, plus $52,858,301 in additional capital improvements. Id. The dis-
trict court subsequently ordered more capital improvements, totaling an additional $187,450,334.
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
22. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 411-13 (citing Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)).
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taxpayers.2 5 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court had the power
to impose a property tax increase directly on local constituents 2 6 and "affirm[ed]
the actions that the [district] court ha[d] taken to this point" to achieve the
increase in property taxes.27 The Eighth Circuit then noted that the principle of
federal-state comity mandated the use of "minimally obtrusive methods to rem-
edy constitutional violations."'2 8 The appellate court stated that in the future,
therefore, the principle of comity would prohibit the district court from directly
imposing the property tax. As a future alternative to the court-imposed tax, the
Eighth Circuit held that the district court should authorize KCMSD to collect
the tax and enjoin state laws barring KCMSD from financing the remedy.29
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari,
limited to the issue of whether the district court had the power to impose a
property tax increase. 30 The Court unanimously ruled that the district court
had abused its discretion by directly imposing the tax.31 After concurring in this
important initial determination, however, the Justices diverged sharply.
The majority ruled that the district court had violated the principle of com-
ity governing its exercise of equitable powers in this area.32 The Court noted
that the district court had the choice of an available and less intrusive method of
effectuating desegregation-the appellate court's solution. Because this alterna-
tive was available, the majority reasoned that the district court's direct imposi-
tion of a tax violated the principle of comity33 and reversed its imposition of the
tax.3 4
After reversing the district court, the majority proceeded to discuss the
Eighth Circuit's modifications of the district court's order.35 The Court ad-
25. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1318 (8th Cir. 1988).
26. Id. at 1313-14. The appellate court relied heavily on Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964), in determining that the federal courts had the power to impose the tax. For a discussion
of Griffin, see infra notes 72-80, 132-38 and accompanying texts.
The Eighth Circuit also relied on its own previous decisions in its opinion. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei
v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984) and United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. R-2 v. United States, 423 U.S. 951
(1975)). See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
27. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988).
28. Id.
29. Id. The court concluded that this alternative would effectuate the same purposes, while still
giving deference to the authority of local and state officials. Id.
30. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1660. The Court denied certiorari on the scope of the district court's
remedial order. Id. at 1664.
Although the Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to the property tax issue, the Court
dedicated a disproportionate part of its opinion to a preliminary issue: Whether the State had filed a
timely appeal and whether it was therefore within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear the case.
Id. at 1660-62. On this issue, the Court ultimately deferred to the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of
its own order which qualified the state's appeal within the relevant time constraints. Id. at 1662,
31. Id. at 1663; id. at 1667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
32. Id. at 1663. The principle of comity in the desegregation context requires the district court
to employ the method that allows local and state authorities, which have primary responsibility for
implementing the remedy, the greatest amount of deference. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1663-67. Because the Court reversed the district court's order directly imposing the
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dressed four main issues related to the Eighth Circuit's approach: federal-state
comity, apportionment of costs, federalism, and separation of powers.
First, the Court confronted the issue of whether the appellate court's solu-
tion was consonant with the principle of comity. The State contended that the
funding violated the principle of comity because the scope of the remedial order
exceeded the constitutional mandate.36 To consider whether the funding was
the least intrusive method available, the State argued, the Court must also con-
sider the expansive remedial measures approved by the district court. 37 The
majority, however, skirted the State's argument by noting that because the
Court had denied certiorari on the scope of the remedy, this issue was outside its
jurisdiction.38
Second, the majority addressed the district court's apportionment of costs
between the State and KCMSD. The Court rejected the State's contention that
because the district court found the State jointly and severally liable with
KCMSD, it should have allowed any portion of the remedy not met by KCMSD
to fall on the State.39 The majority reasoned that because the appellate court
had ordered the district court to apportion the costs, the district court had not
abused its discretion in ruling that KCMSD must fund its portion of the rem-
edy. 4° The Court concluded that apportionment of costs was within the equita-
ble powers of the district court.4 1
The majority next addressed the two constitutional issues: federalism and
separation of powers. The Court summarily dismissed any contention that the
appellate court's modifications42 violated the tenth amendment 43 and the princi-
ple of federalism.4 4 The Court reasoned that a court order compelling compli-
ance with the fourteenth amendment does not violate the tenth amendment's
reservation of powers to the states.45 The majority noted that the enactment of
the fourteenth amendment specifically limited the powers of the states, and thus
a federal court could compel a state to guarantee its citizens their constitutional
rights under the amendment.46
The second constitutional issue the majority addressed was whether the or-
tax increase, Justice Kennedy characterized the remainder of the majority's opinion as mere dicta.
Id. at 1667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra note 53.
36. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664. In discussing the scope of the order, the State was referring to
the expansive improvements the district court had approved. See supra note 21.
37. Brief for Petitioners at 42-43, Jenkins v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1664 (1990) (No. 88-
1150).
38. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664.
40. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987)).
41. Id. at 1665 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977)).
42. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see infira text accompanying note 200.
44. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665. For a discussion of the principle of federalism, see infra text
accompanying notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
45. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)).
46. Id.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
der violated separation of powers.47 The Jenkins Court reasoned that precedent
unquestionably had established the power of the federal judiciary to act accord-
ing to the appellate court's decree. Specifically, the majority held that Griffin v.
County School Board48 permitted the federal court to compel local officials to
levy a tax to desegregate schools. 49 Additionally, the Court ruled that a "long
and venerable line of cases" authorized the court to disregard state law limiting
taxes "where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the
statutory limitation." 50
Thus, the Jenkins Court reversed the district court's direct imposition of
the property tax increase. 5 1 The majority, however, did not perceive the same
constitutional obstacles in the Eighth Circuit's modifications enjoining the state
statutory limitation and compelling KCMSD to impose the property tax. The
Court summarily dismissed the State's contention that these modifications vio-
lated the principles of federal-state comity, allocation of costs, federalism, and
separation of powers, and affirmed the appellate court's modifications of the
lower court ruling.5 2
Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.5 3 Except for the first two paragraphs, Justice Kennedy devoted
his "concurrence" to disputing and attempting to discredit Parts III and IV of
the majority's opinion.5 4 The concurrence attempted to refute the underlying
47. Id. For a discussion of the principle of separation of powers in the taxation context, see
infra text accompanying notes 162-99.
48. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964). For a discussion of Griffin, see infra notes 72-80, 132-38 and
accompanying texts.
49. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665.
50. Id. at 1665-66. The line of cases cited by the majority to support this proposition arose
from the inability of municipal corporations to pay debt obligations due to state statutory tax limita-
tions enacted subsequent to the contract loan agreements. Id.; see infra note I ll (citing cases).
51. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663, 1667.
52. Id. at 1667.
53. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy in his opinion. Presumably, Justice
Kennedy labeled his opinion to denote the significance he ascribed to the separate parts of the major-
ity's opinion. As noted previously, Justice Kennedy's opinion concurred that the district court ex-
ceeded its authority in directly imposing the tax. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy viewed this, however, as the only determination nec-
essary to decide the issue before the court. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). He characterized Parts III and IV of the majority's opinion as "broad dictum,"
"premature," and unnecessary. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Kennedy's failure to designate his opinion as "concurring in part and dissenting in
part," despite his adamant opposition to Parts III and IV of the majority's opinion, was meant to
emphasize his view that the last two sections of the majority's opinion contain no precedential value.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54. Justice Kennedy's concurrence also considered the collateral issue of the scope of the reme-
dial order. The majority dismissed this issue based on what it believed to be a lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 1664. Justice Kennedy dedicated a substantial portion of his opinion to detailing what he
considered the unparalleled remedial orders approved by the district court. See id. at 1667-68, 1676-
78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He reasoned that in order to
determine whether the district court was justified in imposing the tax increase, it was necessary to
consider if the remedy to be financed was constitutionally mandated. He concluded that review of
the scope of the remedy was a necessary prerequisite to any judgment "whether a judicial tax was
appropriate in this case." Id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (emphasis in original).
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premise of the majority's opinion-that a significant distinction exists between a
district court's direct imposition of a property tax increase and a judicial order
compelling the legislature to implement the same burden.55
Justice Kennedy's reasoning was as follows: Under Missouri law, local
governmental bodies have no authority to levy a tax beyond the precise statute
that the majority ordered to be enjoined.5 6 Because no such authority existed
under state law, any authority for an order directing KCMSD to impose a tax
had to come from the federal judiciary. Thus, the majority's order compelling
KCMSD to levy the property tax implicated the same problems as did a direct
judicial tax, and its attempted distinction was merely specious.57
Because he concluded that the majority's distinction was meaningless, Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted that the Court's opinion violated two fundamental consti-
tutional axioms: due process and federalism. First, he stated that the taxing
power is an exclusively legislative, not judicial function.58 Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy contended that judicial taxation circumvented the legislative process
designed to give taxpayers representation in taxing decisions. 59 He concluded
that a direct judicial tax was a "blatant denial of due process" of the local
constituents.60
Second, Justice Kennedy argued that the imposition of a direct tax by the
federal judiciary onto a local government also implicated "federalism con-
cerns." 61 The primary concern was that the independent, life-tenured federal
judiciary was in no way representative of or responsive to the local taxpayers. 62
Justice Kennedy asserted that such a judicial tax on the local constituents was
akin to the taxation without representation that spurred the American colonies'
break with England. 63 Justice Kennedy also expressed the concern that the fed-
eral judiciary is not equipped to handle such difficult and complicated matters as
55. Id. at 1669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra
notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
57. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1675 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Kennedy asserted that the majority failed to recognize that a local body must possess
the authority to tax before a federal court can compel it to exercise this power. He asserted that the
majority's reliance on cases upholding a judicial compulsion of a tax when the local government
possessed taxing authority under state law was misplaced and misconstrued. Id. at 1673-75 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy's
due process argument raises the same underlying concerns as the separation of powers argument
discussed later in this Note. See infra notes 162-99 and accompanying text. It is likely that he
characterized this constitutional infraction as a denial of due process because of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to apply the separation of powers doctrine to federal-state relations. See infra notes 193-
99 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy might have buttressed this argument by noting that
taxpayers typically have no right to be heard in a judicial proceeding adjudicating tax decisions.
More specifically, he might have pointed out that in Jenkins a group of local taxpayers did attempt
to protect their interests, but were denied the right to intervene in the suit. See Jenkins v. Missouri,
855 F.2d 1295, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1988).
61. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
62. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
63. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taxation, while a local legislature is.64
Justice Kennedy concluded that the majority's opinion, in attempting to
remedy equal protection violations in the Kansas City public school system, un-
necessarily authorized the violation of other essential constitutional principles.65
Furthermore, the repeated violation of these principles through extension to a
variety of other contexts, Justice Kennedy stated, could blur the fundamental
distinctions between the different branches of government which "over time
could threaten fundamental alteration of the form of government our Constitu-
tion embodies."'66
In adjudicating the propriety of funding a desegregation remedy through a
judicially compelled tax, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins confronted
two separate and conflicting lines of cases. The district courts, in vindicating the
constitutional guarantees of minority schoolchildren, have assumed broad equi-
table powers. In contrast, the federal courts' power to remunerate petitioners
through a judicially compelled tax traditionally has been severely limited. Thus,
in Jenkins, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a district court's broad
equitable powers in formulating desegregation remedies included the power to
compel a property tax increase.
The first line of cases the Jenkins Court had to consider involved the equita-
ble powers of the courts in desegregating public schools. In Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1),67 the Supreme Court announced that segregation in pub-
lic education denies minorities equal protection of the laws in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. One year later in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
I1),68 the Supreme Court first attempted to delineate appropriate remedies for
public school integration. In attempting to allocate responsibility for imple-
menting solutions, the Brown II Court elaborated on the respective roles of the
different branches of government in effectuating desegregation remedies:
"School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing consti-
tutional principles."'69 The Brown 1I Court then announced certain general
64. Id. at 1672-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). Although
Justice Kennedy characterized these concerns as a violation of the principle of federalism, most if
not all of these arguments also relate to the differences between the judicial and legislative branches
of government. These arguments typically would be encompassed in a separation of powers prob-
lem. See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
65. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
66. Id. at 1678-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Brown I rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine
announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896). 347 U.S. at 494-45. The Court held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment required the integration of public schools.
Id.
68. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown 11, the Court addressed the issue of remedies for the consti-
tutional violations found in Brown L Id. at 298-99. After receiving briefs and arguments from all
the parties and amicus curiae states, the Court held that the cases should be remanded to the district
courts for a determination of the specific remedies. Id. at 299. The Court announced certain general
standards for the lower courts to follow.
69. Id.
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standards for the district courts to follow in effectuating desegregation remedies:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been charac-
terized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. . . . But it
should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional princi-
ples cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with
them.70
The Brown II Court further held that the district courts should "take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees... as are necessary and proper to
admit [all children] to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with
all deliberate speed."' 7 1 Thus, the Brown II Court expounded on the roles of the
different branches of government and also attempted to delineate general guide-
lines for the lower courts to follow in carrying out the mandate of Brown L
The Supreme Court elucidated the precise meaning of these general guide-
lines ten years after Brown I, in Griffin v. County School Board.72 Griffin in-
volved a county school board's enactment of several evasive policies designed to
avoid carrying out the principles of Brown L Beginning in 1959, the county
supervisors refused to levy any school taxes for the upcoming school year. 73 As
a result, the county's public school system remained closed from 1959 up to the
time of the suit in 1964. 74 At the same time, however, the county supervisors
passed ordinances giving tuition grants to parents of schoolchildren who at-
tended nonsectarian private schools and allowing property tax credits for dona-
tions to such institutions.75
The Supreme Court in Griffin "agree[d] with the District Court that closing
the Prince Edward County schools and meanwhile contributing to the support
of the private segregated white schools that took their place denied petitioners
the equal protection of the laws." 76 The Court then focused its attention on
what remedies would be "necessary and appropriate" to eliminate the vestiges of
segregation. 77 The Griffin Court affirmed the judgment enjoining the payment
of tuition grants and tax exemptions by the county officials, ruling that the in-
junction was clearly within the power of the district court. 78 More importantly,
the Court held:
70. Id. at 300.
71. Id. at 301.
72. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
73. Id. at 222.
74. Id. at 222-23.
75. Id. at 223. The Court found that these ordinances, although neutral on their faces, had a
discriminatory effect on black schoolchildren in Prince Edward County. Id. at 233.
76. Id. at 232.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 232-33.
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[T]he District Court may, if necessary to prevent further racial dis-
crimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs
to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain
without racial discrimination a public school system in Prince Edward
County like that operated in other counties in Virginia.7 9
Thus, the Griffin Court held that a district court's broad equitable powers in-
clude the authority to compel a local governing body to act within its existing
powers to raise funds for public schools.3 0
In North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann (Swann I),81 the
Supreme Court addressed the propriety of enjoining a state law forestalling de-
segregation. This law prohibited school busing on the basis of race and was
enacted in anticipation of a federal court order prescribing such action.82 The
Court held that "if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion
operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system.., it
must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of
federal constitutional guarantees."'83 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower
court's injunction of North Carolina's anti-busing law.84 In so doing, the Court
expanded the extent of the district courts' broad equitable authority to include
the power to enjoin state laws that hinder vindication of constitutional
guarantees.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Swann 1),a5 a
companion case to Swann I, the Supreme Court addressed the extent of a district
court's equitable powers to redress a local government's failure to propose an
acceptable, effective desegregation plan. 86 In Swann II, the Court considered a
controversial court-ordered school busing program that attempted to integrate
schools by transporting students to schools outside their immediate geographical
area.8 7 In determining the propriety of the program, the Court expounded on
79. Id. at 233.
80. Id. The Virginia Constitution gave the local school board in Griffin the authority to levy
the tax ordered by the Court. Id. at 221. Therefore, the Court was able to compel such action
without confronting the issue of whether district courts would have this power if the local board did
not possess the authority under state law.
81. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
82. Id. at 44-45.
83. Id. at 45.
84. Id. at 46.
85. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Although this case precedes North Carolina State Board of Education v.
Swann in the reporter, it is labeled Swann II for purposes of this discussion. The Court handed
down both decisions on the same day.
86. The Supreme Court previously had addressed the powers of the district courts to integrate
schools after a local government had adopted a wholly inadequate desegregation plan. See Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the local school board had adopted a "freedom
of choice" plan that allowed all students to elect which of the two county schools they would attend,
Id. at 433-34. The Court noted that this plan had been utterly ineffective in establishing the constitu-
tionally-mandated integrated school system. Id. at 441. Consequently, the Green Court held, "The
burden on a school board ... is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439 (emphasis in original). Thus, in Green, the Court
mandated that local officials proffer an effective desegregation remedy, but failed to specify what
powers the district court possessed to enforce the requirement. See id.
87. Swann I, 402 U.S. at 29-30. The plan at issue in Swann 11 was adopted by the Court after
the local school board failed to offer an acceptable remedy. Id. at 10.
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the proper role of the judiciary in effectuating desegregation orders,88 an issue
that the Court previously had addressed in Brown II.89 The Court held that
although the local school authorities traditionally have prima y responsibility
for formulating effective remedies, "[i]n default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system." 90 The Court held
that because the school officials had failed to offer an acceptable plan, the court-
ordered remedy was within the equitable powers of the district court. 9 1
Equally important, however, was the Swann II Court's express recognition
that the district courts' remedial powers are not unlimited:
In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this
remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial pow-
ers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation.
Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the
shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial author-
ity enters only when local authority defaults.92
Thus, Swann II established the authority of the federal district courts to
formulate their own remedies when school officials fail to proffer an acceptable
plan. The Court emphasized, however, that these remedial powers are not ple-
nary. This judicial authority arises only when local authorities have failed to
offer a suitable solution for the constitutional violation.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's remedies in
Swann II, the Court in several subsequent decisions overturned remedies or-
dered by district courts. In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1),93 the Supreme
Court was concerned with a district court order that prescribed an interdistrict
remedy in response to a showing of intradistrict segregation within the Detroit
metropolitan area.94 The Court held that this remedy exceeded the constitu-
tional violation and, therefore, was outside the district court's equitable pow-
ers.95 The Milliken I Court reasoned that remedies exceeding constitutional
violations are an unjustifiable infringement on the authority of local legislative
bodies.96 The Court also stated that such a remedy would be contrary to the
88. Id. at 16.
89. See supra text accompanying note 69.
90. Swann II, 402 U.S. at 16.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 16.
93. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
94. Id. at 742-43. The interdistrict remedy involved relief across fifty-four independent school
districts, but the violation was found to exist only in the Detroit schools. Id. at 743.
95. Id. at 745. The Court stated that the nature and extent of the constitutional violation
determines the scope of the remedy and, therefore, only a showing of interdistrict segregation justi-
fies an interdistrict remedy. Id. at 744-45 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
96. See id. at 743-44.
[Tihe District Court will become first, a de facto "legislative authority" to resolve these
complex questions, and then the "school superintendent" for the entire area. This is a task
which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people
of control of schools through their elected representatives.
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deference traditionally given local officials in matters involving public
education. 97
After several more decisions limiting the equitable powers of the district
courts, 98 the Milliken case was re-argued before the Supreme Court in Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken 1I).99 In Milliken I1 the Court synthesized these various
desegregation decisions and adopted a three-part test to determine the limits of
the district courts' equitable powers:
Application of those "equitable principles," we have held, re-
quires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the first place, like
other equitable remedies, the nature of the desegregation remedy is to
be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation.
The remedy must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to of-
fend the Constitution. . . ." Second, the decree must indeed be reme-
dial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible "to
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Third, the fed-
eral courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent
with the Constitution. 1o
The novelty of the Milliken 11 test lies in its final prong, which added an
essential element to the analysis of district courts' powers. This final element
requires the federal courts to balance the rights and interests of local and state
governments against an individual's rights protected by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 101 The state and local government inter-
ests are primarily federalism and separation of powers issues raised by a federal
judicial order specifying remedies in a state or local legislative arena.102
Because Jenkins involved financing for a desegregation remedy, a brief dis-
cussion of the district court's equitable powers in effectuating such orders is
helpful in appreciating the significance of the case. Because the case also in-
97. See id. at 741-42 ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational
process.").
98. In a case very similar to Milliken I, the Supreme Court once again held that a system-wide
remedy was not justified without a showing of system-wide segregation. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977). The Court's rationale in Brinkman echoed its rationale in
Milliken I: "But instead of tailoring a remedy commensurate to the three specific violations, the
Court of Appeals imposed a systemwide remedy going beyond their scope." Id.
In another important case, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976),
the Court expounded on limitations other than the interdistrict remedies overturned in Milliken I
and Brinkman. In Spangler, the Court held that the district court exceeded its authority in requiring
an annual readjustment of the attendance zones. Id. at 440. The purpose of this readjustment was to
prevent any school from having a majority of students composed of any one minority group, Id.
99. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
100. Id. at 280-81 (citing Swann II, 402 U.S. at 16, and quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 738, 746)
(citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The Jenkins Court was not concerned with
the first two prongs of the Milliken I test because they are aimed at the scope of the remedy, an
issue skirted by the Jenkins Court. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Jenkins denied certio-
rari on this issue. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
101. See Note, Judicial Taxation in Desegregation Cases, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 332, 339 (1989).
102. Id. at 340-42.
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volves the judicial imposition or compulsion of a tax, it is helpful to explore a
number of cases addressing the taxation issue outside the desegregation context.
This line of cases illustrates both the allocation of authority between the differ-
ent branches of government in matters involving taxation and the limited in-
stances when judicial interference in these matters is permissible.
In several cases adjudicating matters involving taxation, the Supreme Court
has delineated the respective roles of the different government branches in such
matters. For example, the Court has held that taxation by a legislative body
does not implicate any due process concerns, even if all constituents are not
notified and heard.103 In contrast, the Court has ruled that attempted taxation
by other governmental branches may implicate constitutional concerns. Specifi-
cally, the Court has held that due process may be implicated even if the taxing
body is an administrative agency to which the legislature has delegated the
power to tax.10 4
More importantly, the Supreme Court consistently has held that the federal
judiciary has no constitutional authority to impose a tax directly.10 5 In Moses
Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County,10 6 the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit's remand of the case, directing the district court to reduce the imposed
tax, was unwarranted:
The effect of the Court's remand was to direct the District Court to
decree a valid tax for the invalid one which the State had attempted to
exact. The District Court has no power so to decree. Federal courts
may not assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate taxing officials...
may assess and levy taxes... and the federal courts may determine,
within their jurisdiction, only whether the tax levied by those officials
is or is not a valid one. 107
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that taxation is the exclusive province
of the legislative branch, and exercise of that power by any other branch may
implicate constitutional problems.10 8 More specifically, the Court has held that
any action by the federal judiciary which could be viewed as a direct imposition
103. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915)
("[Taxpayers'] rights are protected in the only way they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."). In Bi-Metallic, the Supreme Court held that
an order to increase the valuation of all taxable property did not amount to a taking of the plaintiff's
property without due process of law merely because he was not given an opportunity to be heard on
the matter. Id. at 444-46.
104. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908). The Londoner Court held that
when a state delegates the taxing power to a subordinate body, due process requires that the taxpayer
have the chance to be heard. Id.
105. See, eg., Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1509 (1989); Moses Lake
Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 752 (1961).
106. 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
107. Id. at 752. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its view that a direct imposition of a
state tax is clearly outside the authority of the federal judiciary. Davis, 109 S. Ct. at 1509 (citing
Moses Lake Homes, 365 U.S. at 752). In Davis, the Court rejected a possible remedy of eliminating
all state employee retirement exemptions because it noted that this could be viewed as a direct impo-
sition of a state tax. Id.
108. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
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of a tax is plainly unconstitutional. 109
Although the Court has held that federal courts cannot impose a tax di-
rectly, the Court repeatedly has confronted the related issue of whether the fed-
eral judiciary has the power to compel a local government to levy taxes to
enforce its debt obligations in the "municipal bond" cases. 110 In these cases the
Supreme Court has held that when a local body has taxing authority under pre-
existing state law, the federal courts have the power to compel the local govern-
ment to tax its constituents to satisfy its debts."I ' For example, in Von Hoffman
v. City of Quincy,'1 2 certain bonds were issued by a municipal corporation. At
the time of issuance, a state statute empowered the local municipality to levy
taxes sufficient to satisfy its debt obligations."13 Subsequent to the issuance of
the bonds, however, the state passed a statute that limited the municipality's
ability to pay its obligations, unless a majority of the constituents approved the
tax increase.114
The Supreme Court held that this subsequent statute unconstitutionally im-
paired the obligation of the municipality under its contract with the bondhold-
ers. 1 15 After declaring the subsequent statute unconstitutional, the Court ruled
that the presence of the preexisting statute authorized the city to levy taxes to
meet its obligations to the bondholders." 6 Thus, the Court held that a writ of
mandamus could lie against city officials to compel the tax which prior state law
authorized. 117
In contrast, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that when the local
government has no authority to tax under state law, the federal courts have no
power to compel the local body to tax.1 18 For example, in Rees v. City of Water-
109. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
110. Most of these cases arose out of the issuance of railroad bonds during the late nineteenth
century. Local municipalities issued these bonds to provide sufficient capital for the construction of
railroads. Problems arose when the municipalities could not raise sufficient revenue to pay the
bonds. See Note, Local Taxes, Federal Courts, and School Desegregation in the Proposition 13 Era,
78 MICH. L. REv. 587, 593 n.34 (1980).
111. See, eg., Louisiana ex reL Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 181 (1909)
(holding writ of mandamus lies against county officials to tax in order to satisfy debt obligations
because subsequent statute unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations); Graham v. Folsom, 200
U.S. 248, 253 (1906) (holding abolition of municipal corporation equivalent to statute which uncon-
stitutionally infringes on contract obligation and therefore granting writ of mandamus to compel
county officials to levy tax); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358, 368-69 (1880) (granting a writ of
mandamus against the municipality for overdue bonds because local officials had authority to tax);
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554-55 (1866) (holding that after the court
struck down a state law as an unconstitutional infringement on contract obligations, the preexisting
state law authorized the local officials to levy a tax).
112. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866).
113. Id. at 536-37.
114. Id. The limitation in question authorized the local city council to levy property taxes up to
a certain level, but required voter approval in order to raise it beyond this level. Id. at 537. Thus,
the limitation in Von Hoffman is similar to the one involved in Jenkins. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
115. Von Hoffman, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 549, 554.
116. Id. at 555.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 501 (1880) (holding that when a state legisla-
ture has not granted local authority the power to tax, a court is powerless to compel a tax); United
States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 591 (1878) ("We have no power by mandamus to compel a
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town, 119 municipal bondholders sued to compel city officials to levy taxes to
satisfy the city's debts.120 In contrast to Von Hoffman, no state statutes author-
ized the local governmental body to levy taxes to satisfy the municipal bonds in
Rees.121 Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that without the underlying
state grant of authority, federal courts were powerless to compel a tax.122
The Rees Court reasoned that to compel such a tax would violate two fun-
damental constitutional principles: separation of powers and federalism.
We are of the opinion that this court has not the power to direct a
tax to be levied for the payment of these judgments. This power to
impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty,
and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only; and,
second, by the power of legislative authority only. It is a power that
has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the
power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the
exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so important. 123
Thus, the Supreme Court consistently has held that when no authority ex-
ists under state law, federal courts have no power to compel local governments
to tax, and, in addition, any attempt to do so would violate the constitutional
principles of separation of powers and federalism. 124 In juxtaposition, the Court
repeatedly has held that when local authorities possess the power to levy a tax
but for the enactment of a statute which unconstitutionally infringes on their
contractual obligations, federal courts have the authority to compel them to ex-
ercise their preexisting taxing power. 125
The significance of Jenkins lies in part in its attempt to clarify conflicting
circuit court rationales for problems of financing desegregation. 126 By granting
municipal corporation to levy a tax which the law does not authorize. We cannot create new rights
or confer new powers. All we can do is bring existing powers into operation."); Heine v. Levee
Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655, 661 (1873) (holding that when there is no specific grant of author-
ity by the state to levy a tax, the court has no power to compel the local municipality to impose a
tax); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 116-17 (1873) (holding that the state had
not given the local body the authority to tax and thus the district court had no power to compel a tax
to satisfy its debt obligations).
119. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1873).
120. Id. at 107-08.
121. Id. at 116-17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
126. At the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Jenkins, the lower courts had
taken three main approaches to financing desegregation. See generally Annotation, Propriety of Fed-
eral Court's Ordering State or Local Tax Increase to Effectuate Civil Rights Decree, 76 A.L.R. FED.
504 (1986) (discussing cases that have ruled on the propriety of a federal court order directly or
indirectly imposing taxes on a state or local governing body). These varying approaches reflect the
different views the circuits have developed regarding the proper role of the federal courts in state
fiscal policies. See Note, supra note 101, at 332.
The first method, which was adopted by the Eighth Circuit alone, interpreted the equitable
powers of the federal courts as encompassing the authority to impose a direct tax without regard to
state law limitations. Id. at 336. The Eighth Circuit twice commented in dicta that a federal court's
authority includes the power to impose a tax to effectuate desegregation even if in contradiction to
state law. Liddell v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir.) (although rejecting the district
court's direct imposition of a tax, the Eighth Circuit noted that the district court's equitable power
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certiorari, the Supreme Court gave itself an opportunity to make a dispositive
statement on this equivocal area of the law-the juncture between the expansive
equitable powers of the federal courts to formulate desegregation remedies and
the restricted federal judicial power to compel taxation in contradiction to state
law limitations. 127
Although the Jenkins Court undeniably held that direct imposition of a
local tax by a federal district court was unconstitutional, a closer analysis of the
majority's distinction reveals that its approval of an indirect method, which op-
erates like a direct judicial tax, implicates the same constitutional problems. The
Jenkins majority held that, although the district court could not impose the tax
directly on KCMSD, the federal court could enjoin the state laws limiting
KCMSD's power to increase property taxes, and "authoriz[e]" and direct the
local body to implement the tax increase.1 28 The Court reasoned that this dis-
tinction avoided any of the constitutional problems that might be implicated by
a direct federal judicial tax. 129 The majority held that this distinction was am-
ply supported by Supreme Court precedent. 130 As Justice Kennedy noted, how-
ever, closer analysis of the "long and venerable line of cases" 131 cited by the
majority reveals a fundamental flaw in the Jenkins Court's attempted distinction
and thus its underlying rationale.
The majority interpreted Griffin v. County School Board 132 as establishing a
district court's authority to compel local officials to levy a tax to fund a public
included the authority to impose such a tax if all other financial alternatives had been exhausted),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1372-73 (8th Cir.)
(although rejecting the district court's imposition of a tax, the appellate court stated that the district
court did possess this power), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975). The recent Eighth Circuit holding
in Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988), approving a district court's direct impo-
sition of a property tax, is merely the logical culmination of other previous decisions by this appellate
court.
'The second method, a judicial purgatory, states that although judicial deference should gener-
ally be afforded to state and local legislatures, there is some leeway for judicial interference with
financing school desegregation. This is the position held by both the Third and Seventh Circuits.
See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir.) (affirming district
court's order to raise additional funds for desegregation remedy, but emphasizing that it was not
within the court's power to order the legislature as to specific revenue alternatives), cert. denied sub
nom Orr v. Board of School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 777
(3d Cir. 1978) (reversing the district court's order directly imposing a tax, but noting that there
could arise a situation in which the balance would permit a judicially imposed tax), cert. denied sub
nom. Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
The third and final approach reflects the view that public school financing is the province of
local and state governing bodies and, thus, is outside the purview of the federal judiciary. The Fifth
and Sixth Circuits have adopted this restrictive view of federal judicial authority in the area of school
taxes. National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1977) (ruling that financing for
school desegregation is a power vested in state governmental branches and not the federal judiciary);
Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 833 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a
district court has no power to specify the "source, manner and controls" of desegregation financing).
127. See generally Note, supra note 110 (discussing the implications of the interaction of state
tax limitations and the equitable powers of the courts in effectuating desegregation remedies).
128. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct at 1663.
129. Id. at 1665 ("[A] court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is
plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court.").
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1667.
132. 377 U.S. 218 (1964); see supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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school desegregation remedy. The Court relied heavily on Griffin in affirming
the appellate court's decree, which directed the district court to order KCMSD
to levy the property tax, irrespective of state-law limitations. 133 The majority,
however, failed to recognize the inherent limitation contained in the exact lan-
guage that the Court quoted from Griffin.134 The Griffin Court held that a dis-
trict court may compel local officials "to exercise the power that is theirs to levy
taxes."'135 In Griffin, the local officials had the express power to levy and collect
taxes for the operation of public schools. 136 As the Court's remarks indicate,
this fact was essential to its ruling.137 Consequently, under an accurate interpre-
tation of Griffin, a federal court has the power to compel a local governing body
to tax, but only to the extent authorized under state law. 138
This principle also is recognized in the "long and venerable line of cases"
the majority cited as supporting its ruling.13 9 In Von HoJ'nan v. City of
Quincy, 140 for example, the Supreme Court held that the district court had the
power to compel the local legislature to levy taxes sufficient to satisfy its debt
obligations because existing state law authorized the local officials to levy this
tax. 14 1 In Heine v. Levee Commissioners,142 however, the Supreme Court specif-
ically refused to compel the local legislature to levy taxes to pay its bond obliga-
tions. 143 The Heine Court based its reasoning on the lack of local authority
under existing state law to levy a tax. '" The juxtaposition of the different re-
sults reached in the municipal bond cases, 145 as well as the express language in
Griffin,146 illustrate that a local body must have authority under existing state
law before federal courts can compel that body to levy a tax. " 7
133. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665.
134. Cf. Note, supra note 110, at 592 (discussing, in the abstract, the problems with applying the
holding in Griffin to situations involving a state limitation on local taxing authority).
135. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 232; see supra note 80.
137. See Comment, Liddell v. Missouri: Financing the Ancillary Costs of Public School Desegre-
gation Through a Court-Ordered Tax Increase, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269, 283 (1985) (noting
that the language in Griffin presupposes that local officials possessed the power to levy taxes); see also
Note, supra note 110, at 594 n.38 (explaining that in the "municipal bond" cases, the Court could
compel the local government to levy taxes only to the extent authorized by state law, and noting that
the language in Griffin recognized this inherent limitation).
138. See Note, supra note 101, at 340 (stating that the limitation that a local government body
must have taxing authority under state law in order for a federal court to compel it to tax, was
applied to the desegregation context in Griffin); Note, An Unorthodox Usurpation of Legislative
Power in Jenkins v. Missouri, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1988) ("Ii effect, the Court in
Griffin limited its taxing power to directing local officials to fulfill a function they were already
empowered by state law to perform.").
139. See supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
140. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866).
141. Id. at 554-55.
142. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655 (1873). Heine is another case in which the bondholders of a local
municipality sued to compel the local body to tax to satisfy its debts. Id. at 657.
143. Id. at 661.
144. See id. at 658. The court ruled that it was exclusively within the power of the legislature to
grant local officials the power to tax. Id. at 661.
145. See supra note 110.
146. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
147. City of Cleveland v. United States, 111 F. 341, 343 (6th Cir. 1901) ("It must, at the outset,
be conceded that a mandamus cannot be awarded to compel the mayor and council of the plaintiff in
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In Jenkins, if KCMSD had been granted the power to levy an unlimited
property tax by a specific state statute, then the district court would have had
the authority to compel it to exercise that power. The fundamental defect in the
majority's rationale results from a failure to recognize that KCMSD had no
power under state law to increase the property tax to $4.05 per $100 of assess-
ment value without voter approval. 148 It is well established that since a local
government is merely a creation of state law, any authority it possesses must
emanate from that state's laws. 149 This principle is recognized expressly in arti-
cle X, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution: "The taxing power may be exer-
cised ... by counties and other political subdivisions under power granted to
them by the general assembly for county, municipal and other corporate pur-
poses."' 150 Thus, for KCMSD to have authority to levy a tax, the state legisla-
ture must have granted it authority under a specific Missouri law.
In Jenkins, however, the only state constitutional provision that granted
KCMSD authority to levy property taxes simultaneously limited this power to
$1.25 per $100 of assessment value, unless an increase was approved by the local
constituents. 151 Under existing state law, KCMSD thus had no authority to
raise the property tax beyond the $1.25 mark without voter approval. More-
over, this is the precise provision that the majority ordered the district court to
enjoin.152 If the district court enjoined this provision, it would withdraw all of
KCMSD's authority under existing state law to levy property taxes.153
Although the language used by the Jenkins Court suggests that its order
directed the district court to enjoin the entire state law limiting KCMSD's
power to levy a property tax, 154 it could be argued that the majority intended
that the district court enjoin only the limitation in the statute. This reasoning is
error to levy any tax which they were not authorized to levy by the law of the state from which they
derive their powers."); see Note, supra note 101, at 340 ("The Supreme Court consistently held that
although federal courts can use the mandamus power to compel local officials to exercise their statu-
tory duties, the courts cannot use it to extend the officials' statutory authority."). Compare cases
cited supra at note 11 (permitting judicial compulsion of taxation when authority exists under state
law) with cases cited supra at note 118 (refusing to compel taxation where no specific grant of au-
thority exists under state law).
148. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
149. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (In a decision concerning the
taxing power of the state, the Court noted, as a "settled doctrine[ ]," that "[t]he number, nature and
duration of powers conferred upon these [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they
shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State."); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 655, 661 (1873) ("The [taxing] power must be derived from the legislature of the State.");
City of Cleveland, 111 F. at 343 (holding that there must be a specific grant of authority from the
state legislature for a local body to acquire authority to tax); Note, supra note 110, at 594 (observing
that all powers of local governments must emanate from specific grants of state legislature).
150. Mo. CONST. art. X, § I (emphasis added).
151. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1656 (citing Mo. CONST. art. X, § I l(b), (c)); see supra text accompa-
nying note 15.
152. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1667 (affirming appellate court's holding that district court may
enjoin state law which prevents levy of higher property taxes). In order to "authorize" a property
tax increase, the court would have to enjoin the state constitutional provision which limited the local
body's authority to increase property taxes. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 11(b).
153. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 11(b).
154. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664 ("IThe District Court in the future should . . . enjoin the
operation of state laws that would limit or reduce the levy below that amount [necessary to fund its
portion of the desegregation remedy].").
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flawed because the provision inextricably coupled the grant and limitation of the
power to tax. 155 It is impossible to enjoin the limitation without also enjoining
the specific grant that authorized KCMSD to levy a property tax.156 Because it
is impossible for the district court to enjoin only the statutory limitation, the
Jenkins Court order also necessarily enjoined the only state statute granting
KCMSD the power to levy property, taxes. Without any specific grant of au-
thority from the state legislature, KCMSD was left without legal authority to
levy a property tax.' 57
As previously noted, a federal court possesses no power to compel a legisla-
ture to tax unless the local authority has this authority under state law. 158 If
KCMSD possesses no power to levy a tax under state law, any authority to
impose the tax necessarily must emanate from the federal judiciary. Conse-
quently, the majority's distinction between the court compelling KCMSD to
levy the tax and the court imposing the tax directly is merely superficial. Be-
cause its distinction is chimerical, the Jenkins Court ruling implicates the same
constitutional dilemmas that the majority conceded 159 were violated by a direct
judicial tax.
The constitutional problems implicated by the majority's ruling involve
those principles that the third prong of the Milliken II test requires to be bal-
anced against the equal protection rights protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment: separation of powers' 6° and federalism.' 61 The separation of powers
155. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 1l(a), (b). Section l1(a) grants political subdivisions the author-
ity to levy taxes "subject to their taxing power." Id. § 11(a). Section 11(b) delineates the limits on
these local governments' taxing authority. Id. § 1I(b) ("Any tax imposed upon such property by...
school districts... shall not exceed the following rates: ... one dollar and twenty-five cents on the
hundred dollars of assessed valuation."). Thus, the grant of power in § 11(a) incorporates the inher-
ent limitation in § 11(b). ,
156. See id. § 1I(a), (b).
157. See supra note 149-50 and accompanying text. The majority attempted to address this
issue, but missed the crucial point. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1666. The Court interpreted the State's
argument that there is no authority existing under state law as meaning that the courts have no
power to set aside state limitations on local taxing authority. Id. The majority relied on Von Hoff-
man to illustrate that the federal courts do have this power, id., but the majority misconstrued the
State's contention. The State's argument was not that the courts have no power to enjoin the state
limitation, but instead that once the law is enjoined, the local body possesses no power to levy taxes.
Brief for Petitioners at 34-38, Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). Thus, the Court failed to recognize
the crucial distinction that in Von Hoffman, after striking down a state law as unconstitutional, there
remained a preexisting state statute which gave the local authority the power to tax. See Jenkins,
110 S. Ct. at 1666. The majority probably misconstrued the State's argument because the Court did
not acknowledge that the local government possessed no inherent power to tax without a specific
grant of authority from the Missouri General Assembly. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying
text.
158. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
159. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663.
160. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47, 48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (discussing
separation of powers and its essential function in preventing any one branch of government from
dominating the others); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, in THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF PowERS 39 (B. Goulet ed. 1983) (discussing increas-
ing judicial supervision of governmental bodies through injunctions ordering compliance with con-
stitutional mandates, and the consequent implications for separation of powers); Nagel, Separation of
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 706-24 (1978) (advocat-
ing the re-adoption of the separation of powers doctrine in analyzing federal judicial orders to state
institutions).
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
doctrine is "the basis ... of organization" of the Constitution of the United
States. 162 Maintaining the separate and distinct nature of the different branches
of government was viewed at the time of the constitutional convention as being
"of vital importance." 163 In fact, some of the founding fathers of the Constitu-
tion viewed the maintenance of separation of powers as the essential element in
achieving liberty. 164
Under the separation of powers principle, "the legislative department alone
has access to the pockets of the people." 165 In fact, the Constitution expressly
recognizes that the power of taxation is solely within the legislative purview.
Article III, section 8 begins the enumeration of legislative powers with this state-
ment: "The Congress shall have the power [t]o lay and collect taxes. . .. ,166
Furthermore, the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that the power of
taxation is exclusively legislative: "The power of taxation is legislative, and can-
not be exercised otherwise than under the authority of the legislature., 167
The exclusive allocation of the power to tax to the legislative branch was
not accidental. 168 This delegation primarily resulted from the fundamental con-
cept that the power of taxation must be given to the governmental body that is
representative of and responsible to the taxing constituency.1 69 The Constitu-
tion vested the taxing power in the legislative branch because the political ac-
countability of that branch provides taxpayers with an effective and essential
protection against excessive taxation or disproportionate distribution among
constituents. 170 A related reason for granting legislatures the exclusive power to
161. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (discussing the
importance of federal-state relations in the preservation of the union); Comment, School Desegrega-
tion and Federalism: The Court Inside the Schoolhouse Door, 5 U. DAYTON L. Rlv. 77 (1980)
(analyzing the effects of desegregation decisions on the principle of federalism).
162. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 197 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds.
1987).
For a discussion of the applicability of the separation of powers principle to the relationship
between the federal judiciary and the branches of state government, see infra notes 180-99 and ac-
companying text.
163. J. STORY, supra note 162, at 196.
164. THE FEDERALIT No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No.
47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
165. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed. 1961).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
167. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 501 (1880); see also Rees v. City of Watertown, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 116-17 (1873) ("Th[e] power to impose burdens and raise money... is exercised
... by the power of legislative authority only."); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655,
660-61 (1873) ("The power we are here asked to exercise is the very delicate one of taxation. This
power belongs in this country to the legislative sovereignty, State or National."); supra notes 103-09
and accompanying text (discussing the respective roles of different governmental branches in matters
involving taxation and concluding that it is the exclusive province of the legislature).
168. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
169. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (noting that
local control of taxation for education is essential because it offers participation in the decision-
making procedure which determines how tax revenues will be spent); Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 740 (1978); Note, supra note 101, at 341-42; supra notes 103-09 and
accompanying text.
170. Frug, supra note 169, at 739-40; Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 949, 965-66 (1978).
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tax involves the superiority of legislative processes in allocating scarce resources
among competing claims. 171
In juxtaposition, the federal judicial process by its nature is not designed to
take into account all these opposing demands and interests and consequently
cannot represent adequately all parties affected by a taxation decision. 172 Fur-
thermore, the appointed, life-tenured federal judiciary is by design independent
of the political process and thus is in no way representative of or responsive to
the constituents to be taxed. 173 For these reasons, the framers of the Constitu-
tion did not intend the power of taxation to be within judicial authority. 174 Any
attempt by the federal judiciary to authorize imposition of a tax amounts to a
judicial usurpation of the legislative power to tax. Because the federal judiciary
is not designed to represent the interests of all concerned constituents adequately
in taxation decisions, 175 a federal judicial tax amounts to nothing less than taxa-
tion without representation. 176
In Jenkins, any power to impose a tax increase necessarily must have come
from the federal judiciary because KCMSD lacked authority under existing state
law.177 The Jenkins Court's affirmance of the order compelling KCMSD to levy
a tax not authorized under state law is equivalent to a direct imposition of a
property tax by the federal judiciary. 178 The Jenkins Court ruling therefore vio-
lates the fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers principle
and constitutes a federal judicial usurpation of state legislative power. 179
Although the separation of powers doctrine implicit in the structure of the
Constitution involves the different branches of the federal government, the
Supreme Court has held that the policies underlying this doctrine also apply to
the relationship between state and federal branches of government in matters
involving taxation.180 In the municipal bond cases, the Court acknowledged
171. See Frug, supra note 169, at 740; Mishkin, supra note 170, at 965.
172. See Mishkin, supra note 170, at 965; Note, supra note 101, at 342.
173. See Frug, supra note 169, at 742 ("This shift of power [of raising and allocating revenue]
away from elected officials to individuals appointed for life weakens the democratic accountability of
government."); Mishkin, supra note 170, at 965-66 (stating that federal judges are not under pres-
sures of reelection and are by design insulated from such "political pressures"); Note, supra note
101, at'342 ("[Ihe judiciary is not subject to the political accountability that is commonly held to
justify the legislature's ability to levy taxes."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (A. Hamil-
ton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (discussing the rationale behind the appointment and tenure of the federaljudiciary).
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The judiciary on the
contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse ... and can take no active resolution
whatever."); see also U.S. CONST. art. III (nowhere mentioning the power to tax among the judici-
ary's enumerated powers).
175. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
176. See Mishkin, supra note 170, at 970-71; Comment, supra note 137, at 294; Note, supra note
101, at 342.
177. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 118. The separation of powers principle implicit in the
structure of the Constitution relates to the interaction between the different branches of the federal
government. This is referred to as the "horizontal" application of separation of powers. The "verti-
cal" application of separation of powers refers to the relationship between the federal government
and different branches of state government. Nagel, supra note 160, at 664-65.
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that taxation is an exclusively legislative function.181 Repeatedly, the Court has
held that a federal court has no authority to infringe on a state's exercise of its
taxing power. 182 In these cases, the Court recognized that the policies underly-
ing the exclusive allocation of the power to tax to the legislative branch are
equally applicable when analyzing the relationship between the federal judiciary
and the different branches of state government.
In a more recent plurality decision 8 3 outside the taxation context, how-
ever, Justice Brennan stated in sweepingly broad terms that "the separation-of-
powers principle... has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to
the States." 184 Justice Brennan cited no authority for his blanket rejection of
this important constitutional protection in Elrod v. Burns,185 but presumably
based his plurality opinion on a previous apportionment decision, Baker v.
Carr.186 In Baker, the Court stated that the separation of powers concept is not
involved in the relationship between the federal judiciary and the states in polit-
ical question cases.18 7 The Elrod plurality dramatically expanded this limited
statement beyond the context of Baker to preclude all "vertical" 18 8 applications
of separation of powers. 8 9
181. See supra note 167 (citing cases).
182. See, eg., Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 116-17 (1873) ("[Taxation] is a
power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal
judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so
important."); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 655, 661 (1873) ("It is not only not one of
the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the
Federal government of the legislative functions of the State government."); see also Nagel, supra note
160, at 675 (noting cases in which Court has refused to allow judicial usurpation of taxing power).
183. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Justice Brennan wrote the decision for the Court, in
which only Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Powell
filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 376
(Powell, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 375 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. Id. at 374. As the composition of
the Court indicates, the precedential value of this decision is questionable at best and may be limited
to its specific facts.
184. Id. at 352. In Elrod several Republican noneivil service employees of Cook County, Illi-
nois, sued various incumbent Democratic county officials claiming that they had been fired based
solely on their political affiliation, in violation of their first and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at
349-50. The Court held that it could review the case because neither the political question doctrine
nor the separation of powers principle applied to federal-state relations. Id. at 351-52. The Court
subsequently affirmed the court of appeals' issuance of a preliminary injunction against the county
officials prohibiting them from firing the petitioners. Id. at 373-74.
185. Id. at 352.
186. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Elrod Court cited Baker in the section immediately preceding its
rejection of the applicability of separation of powers to support its holding on the political question
issue in the case. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 351; see also Nagel, supra note 160, at 665-66 (stating that the
Elrod plurality relied on Baker). In Baker, qualified voters of the state of Tennessee filed suit alleg-
ing that the state apportionment scheme debased their votes by dissolution, denying them the equal
protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88. The Court held
that in political question cases the relationship between coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment and not the federal judiciary's relationship with the states is primarily involved. Id. at 210.
Because this distinction allowed the federal judiciary to hear a claim of state political apportionment,
the Court ruled that the petitioners were entitled to a trial and decision. Id. at 236-37.
187. Id. at 210.
188. See supra note 180.
189. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 352; see also Nagel, supra note 160, at 665-66 (noting that the Elrod
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In so doing, however, the Elrod plurality contradicted past precedent
outside the limited context in which the Baker Court acted. As mentioned pre-
viously, the municipal bond cases employed a separation of powers rationale in
refusing to direct federal courts to intervene in matters involving local taxa-
tion.190 The Elrod plurality's holding ignored that, in the municipal bond cases,
the equitable powers of the federal courts were limited by a vertical application
of separation of powers.19 1 The Elrod Court also ignored the history of the
tenth amendment, which suggests that it was adopted in part to preclude the
federal government from violating the principle of separation of powers with
regard to state branches of government. 192
Regardless of whether one accepts the Elrod plurality's sweeping and in-
consistent rejection of the vertical application of separation of powers, the poli-
cies underlying the separation of powers principle 9 3 caution against a federal
court's direct involvement in matters of local taxation. In response to the Elrod
Court's holding, judges and commentators repeatedly have recharacterized in-
fractions of these underlying policies as other constitutional violations in order
to incorporate them into an analysis of the federal courts' relationship with local
legislatures. 194 As these judicial scholars and judges have noted, a fundamental
concept in the founding of the country was that no governmental branch should
be allowed to tax constituents unless they are represented, in the sense of having
political participation in the decision.19 5 The federal judicial process, these
scholars have stated, cannot afford the political participation required by this
fundamental constitutional principle. 196 Furthermore, this structural inade-
quacy remains, irrespective of whether a federal court is infringing on the federal
Court ruling was an "extreme conclusion" considering the limited holding of Baker upon which it
was based).
190. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text; see also Nagel, supra note 160, at 674-75 &
n.86 (discussing the use of separation of powers analysis in the municipal bond cases).
191. See Nagel, supra note 160, at 674.
192. See id. at 668-74. Professor Nagel gives a comprehensive history of the adoption of the
tenth amendment. He details the language in the original proposals of the amendment, which ex-
pressly prohibited separation of powers violations by the federal government to the detriment of the
states. Id. at 669. Professor Nagel asserts that the failure to include this express language in the
final version reflected an assumption that it was unnecessary and superfluous. Id. This assumption,
he states, was based on the fact that this fundamental principle is not stated explicitly in the Consti-
tution itself, but is implied through its structure. Id. at 670.
193. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
194. See, eg., Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1671-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (portraying (1) the local constituents' lack of representation in either a court or legis-
lature as a denial of due process, and (2) the imposition of a tax by the politically independent federal
judiciary as a violation of the principle of federalism); Frug, supra note 169, at 734-43 (characteriz-
ing the allocation of state governmental funds by the federal judiciary as a violation of the "demo-
cratic process" inherent in constitutional structure); Mishkin, supra note 170, at 962, 970-71
(asserting that a federal judicial tax on a state or local legislature violates the "democratic structure
of our government" and amounts to "taxation without representation"); see also Nagel, supra note
160, at 679 n.104 (asserting that the Supreme Court's ruling in Elrod is inconsistent and advocating
the adoption of the separation of powers principle in analyzing federal courts' equitable remedies);
Note, supra note 101, at 341-42 (ignoring the Elrod holding and asserting that a federal judicial tax
violates the separation of powers).
195. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Mishkin, supra note 170, at 971; Note, supra note 101, at 342.
196. See Mishkin, supra note 170, at 971; Note, supra note 101, at 342.
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or on state or local legislatures. 197 Whether it is characterized as a violation of
separation of powers or as some other constitution infraction, the concerns of
lack of representation and accountability apply with equal, if not greater, force
when a federal judge orders a local legislature to impose a tax as it would if she
were to impose the same requirement on Congress. 198 Thus, the Jenkins Court's
ruling directing the district court to order KCMSD to impose a property tax
increase on local constituents implicates the policies underlying the separation of
powers doctrine. 199
Besides violating the underlying policies of the separation of powers princi-
ple, the Jenkins Court holding raises another constitutional concern-federal-
ism. The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that "the Powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' ' 20° Under this
doctrine, the power of financing for education traditionally has been reserved to
the states.20 ' Thus, at first glance, it appears that an attempt by the federal
judiciary to intrude into financing for education violates the tenth amendment.
As the majority notes, however, the Court previously held in Milliken 11
that, "'[t]he Tenth Amendment's reservation of non-delegated powers to the
States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express
prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' "202 What the Jenkins Court failed to acknowledge, though, is that an
inherent limitation restricts this judicial power. The Milliken I Court stated, in
the very same paragraph from which the Jenkins Court quoted, that the district
court did not violate the principle of federalism because it did not "attempt[ ] to
restructure local governmental entities [or] mandate a particular method or
structure of state or local financing."203 Although recognizing the federal
courts' authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment's express prohibitions,
the Milliken II Court implied that an order mandating a particular method of
local financing would violate the principle of federalism. 2° 4
The limitation in Milliken 11 simply recognizes the principle that the power
to levy local taxes205 and fund public school systems20 6 traditionally has been
197. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment); Mishkin, supra note 170, at 971.
198. See Frug, supra note 169, at 743-49; Mishkin, supra note 170, at 970-71; Nagel, supra note
160, at 677-78. But see Comment, supra note 161, at 100-01.
199. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
201. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
202. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). This
holding presumably is based on the rationale that the tenth amendment's reservation of powers must
be read in light of the subsequent enactment of the fourteenth amendment's restrictions on state
powers. See id.
203. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977).
204. See id.
205. See, eg., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959) ("[T]he states have
the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their
local interests."); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) ("[Ihe passage of time has only
served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a [state] legislature in formulating sound tax policies."); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
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reserved to state and local legislatures. 20 7 The rationale behind this reservation
of power is that the legislatures are better equipped to handle such discretionary
tasks than either the federal government or other branches of state govern-
ment.20 8 The Supreme Court has held that a -judicial intrusion into taxation
schemes for education could dramatically and significantly alter federal-state re-
lations. 20 9 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 10 the
Court declined to strike down Texas's local taxing schemes for public education
as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 11
This deferential treatment of state legislative authority in matters involving taxa-
tion for public education was the foundation for the limitation recognized in
Milliken 11.212
In Jenkins, the Court approved an order directing the local school board to
increase the property tax in order to fund the desegregation remedy;2 13 such an
order, however, certainly mandates a particular method of local financing. 2 14
According to the limitation on the power of the federal courts recognized in
Milliken II, the Jenkins Court order violates the principle of federalism embod-
ied in the tenth amendment. 215
Although the Jenkins Court order violates two fundamental constitutional
principles, 2 16 it raises an even more serious concern. As the Supreme Court has
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508 (1937) (The Court noted that the power of "taxation ... was an attribute of
the sovereign power of the states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and . . . was
reserved to them by that instrument.").
206. See, eg., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[L]ocal autonomy
of school districts is a vital national tradition."); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974)
(stating that local control over education is a deeply rooted American tradition).
207. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (stressing the
importance of local governmental control over decisions affecting taxation for educational purposes).
For a discussion of Rodriguez, see infra note 211.
208. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42 ("In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case involves the
most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which the Court's lack
of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed
judgments made at the state and local levels."); cf. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1672-73 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing the practical problems associated
with a judicially administered tax and implying that only legislatures are able to gain the detailed
information about the local community essential to administer such a tax).
209. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44.
210. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
211. Id. at 55. In Rodriguez, the parents of minority schoolchildren filed suit against seven
school districts in San Antonio, Texas, alleging that the state's school financing system violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 4-5 & nn.2 & 6. The petitioners claimed
that the State's system, based on local property taxes, resulted in gross disparities of expenditures
between the richest and poorest districts. Id. at 11-16. The Court held that the principle of federal-
ism prevented it from subjecting the state tax scheme to strict judicial scrutiny; consequently, the
Court refused to strike down the state law because it was not irrational or invidiously discriminatory.
Id. at 44, 55.
212. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
213. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663.
214. Id. at 1672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
215. See Note, supra note 101, at 341. But see Comment, Eliminating Vestiges of School Segrega-
tion: Judiciary Empowered to Remedy Equal Protection Violation by Levying Unauthorized Taxes
[Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988)], 28 WASHBURN L.J. 310, 325-26 (1988) (stating
that principles of federal-state relations will not be violated under Jenkins appellate court decision).
216. See supra notes 160-215 and accompanying text.
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noted, a "desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases in-
volving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional
right. ' 2 17 Thus, the significance of Jenkins also lies in its potential application
to other cases involving funding for constitutional violations where the equitable
powers of the court also play a significant role, such as public housing,21 8 pris-
ons,219 state apportionment schemes, 220 and state mental health systems,221
among others.2 22 In an era when insufficient local funding is an increasingly
acute problem and institutional suits involving the equitable powers of the fed-
eral courts are proliferating,2 23 the extension of the Jenkins holding could seri-
ously undermine the constitutional safeguards against unbridled taxation. For
example, it is conceivable that a federal court could impose several tax increases
on a particular state or locality to remedy different constitutional violations.
The aggregation of several of these separate tax increases within one state might
result in a tax burden on constituents that is excessive, unreasonable, and inequi-
table. Because the litigation process does not afford taxpayers representation in
any of these suits, a federal judge might not be aware of competing claims for
limited state funds and might unwittingly impose such an unreasonable burden.
Alternatively, a federal court could compel a particularly poor state to finance
various constitutional remedies, amounting in the aggregate to a significant por-
tion of that state's budget.224 In effect, the federal court would be usurping the
state legislature's traditional discretion in allocating scarce resources among
217. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
218. See, eg., Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990) (applying basic equity limitations
in holding that district court abused its discretion in fining local officials for not voting for a housing
discrimination remedy without first employing other, less intrusive alternatives); Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 294 (1976) (holding that principles announced in desegregation cases are basic limita-
tions on the equity powers of the federal courts and therefore apply to a public housing case).
219. See, eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (applying the equitable principles
announced in desegregation cases to a case involving unconstitutional prison conditions); Inmates of
Occoguan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[Limitations on the equitable powers of the
federal courts], expounded in the main in school desegregation cases, are fully applicable in cases in
which prison conditions are found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment."); Rhem v. Malcolm,
507 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding prison conditions unconstitutional but holding under the
circumstances that it is better to close prison than infringe upon legislative power of raising sufficient
funds).
220. See, e-g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 (1971) (court erred in "brushing aside
state apportionment policy" in light of limitations); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964)
(court acted properly in reapportioning under principles of equity); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226
(1962) (equal protection clause provides standards for evaluation of state action absent any policy).
For a discussion of Baker, see supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
221. See, eg., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (reserving judgment
on method of raising funds until attempts made by local authorities to implement alternatives), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nomL Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
222. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
223. See Mishkin, supra note 170, at 972-73; cf Frug, supra note 169, at 732-33 (discussing the
deplorable condition of many prisons and mental hospitals and the failure of the political branches of
both the state and federal governments to remedy these conditions, and noting that this has
prompted increasing intervention by federal courts into such areas).
224. Cf Frug, supra note 169, at 715-16 (noting that in one case, the amount necessary to
achieve full compliance with a constitutionally mandated remedy would have equalled sixty percent
of the state budget).
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countervailing claims.225
The Jenkins holding opens a subtle crack in important constitutional struc-
tures, a crack which the federal courts may be frequently called upon to widen
in order to remedy other constitutional violations. As Justice Kennedy noted,
"This assertion of judicial power in one of the most sensitive of policy areas, that
involving taxation, begins a process that over time could threaten fundamental
alteration of the form of government ourConstitution embodies. '22 6 By apply-
ing the ruling in Jenkins to various other contexts, the federal courts could sub-
tly yet vitally undermine two of the essential constitutional safeguards against
unrestrained taxation-the principles of separation of powers and federalism.
As a consequence, the federal courts could permanently alter the relationship
between the federal government and the different branches of state government.
The significance of the Jenkins Court holding is that, the majority's distinc-
tion aside, it marks the first time the Supreme Court has permitted the federal
judiciary to impose a tax on local constituents in contradiction of state law. 227
Furthermore, permitting a federal court to authorize a local governmental body
to impose a property tax unsupported by existing state law violates the funda-
mental constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism. 228 Fi-
nally, because the courts are called upon increasingly to address the problem of
local funding insufficient to support many similar types of constitutional viola-
tions, the holding in Jenkins could have pernicious constitutional ramifications
on the relationship between different branches of government of the federal and
state sovereignties.229
There is, however, an alternate solution to the dilemma raised in Jenkins
that avoids the constitutional infractions and possible ramifications of the solu-
tion offered by the majority.230 The imposition of joint and several liability was
advocated by the State231 but cursorily dismissed by the majority.232 Joint and
225. See id. at 716.
226. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1678-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
227. See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 160-215 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
230. For an overview of alternate remedies to community resistance in the school desegregation
context, see generally Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (expansive evalu-
ation of remedies employed against community resistance to school desegregation).
There is another potential remedy the Court could have adopted. The Court could have di-
rected the district court to order KCMSD to meet its share of the remedy costs while forbidding the
lower court to get involved in any specific financing determinations. In Jenkins, however, this solu-
tion is entirely unacceptable. It would leave the district court between the Scylla of failing to meet a
federal court's constitutionally mandated decree and the Charybdis of imposing a property tax in-
crease in violation of state law.
231. Actually, joint and several liability already had been imposed on the State and KCMSD, at
least in name. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1657 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a (1987)). The court,
however, had chosen to proceed with alternatives to fund KCMSD's portion of the costs, so the
State really was arguing to have KCMSD's unsatisfied portion of the award fall on itself. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 14, Jenkins v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). This is a curious aspect of the
case, because with the imposition of joint and several liability, the State logically would have been
required to pay any portion KCMSD could not meet. In other words, the State was arguing for the
"proper" imposition of joint and several liability.
It is odd, yet informative, that the State would argue to bear a greater portion of the damages
1991]
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several liability in cases involving state and local governmental bodies would
require the state to fund any portion of the remedy the local body was unable to
raise. For example, in Jenkins, because the local government was unable to raise
sufficient funds due to state law limitations, the state would have been responsi-
ble for KCMSD's unmet portion of the financing. This solution would allow the
state to choose whether to repeal the statutory limitation or fund the entire pro-
gram itself. In other words, it would require the state to raise the funds neces-
sary for desegregation but would leave the decision whether to raise taxes or cut
spending to the politically accountable branch. 233
This solution does not violate the principle of federalism because it pre-
serves local and state autonomy by allowing state officials to specify the particu-
lar method of raising funds.234 Furthermore, it does not violate the separation
of powers principle because the power of the federal courts to impose joint and
several liability is well established.235 This solution also offers additional en-
forcement advantages, because if the state desists in raising the necessary funds,
the court may prevent the state from receiving essential federal funds. 236
Although it is both incomprehensible and deplorable that the process of
desegregation is a continuing, recalcitrant problem more than thirty-five years
after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown I, this lamentable state of
affairs cannot justify the judicial imposition of a tax. The Jenkins Court order
permitting judicial taxation violates the fundamental principles of separation of
powers and federalism, and in addition, establishes a precedent that may be ap-
plied to various other contexts involving the equitable powers of the court. In
attempting to achieve the irreproachable goal of expediting the desegregation
process, the majority in Jenkins loses sight of other fundamental constitutional
principles.
Although judicial taxation might be defensible if it were the only method
available to secure funding for constitutionally mandated desegregation reme-
dies, 237 it should never be upheld when other remedies are available. In light of
this principle, the Jenkins Court's judicial usurpation of power is particularly
than was apportioned to it originally. The most logical explanation is that the State preferred to bear
all of the burden of the desegregation plan, rather than to have the federal judiciary prescribe a
specific method of funding in violation of a power the State perceived to be exclusively within its
province.
232. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664-65. The Court reasoned that it was within the district court's
power and not an abuse of discretion to apportion the costs between the State and KCMSD, Id.
The Court noted that the district court's actions were especially justified by the appellate court's
previous order to apportion the costs. Id.; see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
233. Note, supra note 101, at 343.
234. Id.
235. See, eg., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Faison v. Nationwide Mortgage Co., 839 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cerL denied sub nom. Boddie v. Faison, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); see also Note, supra note 101, at 343-45
(discussing joint and several liability as an alternative to judicial taxation).
236. Note, supra note 101, at 344 (asserting that it would be possible to employ a sequestration
on all federal funds due to a state until that state complied with the federal court order).
237. But see Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 518 (1880) (Field, J., concurring) (stating that
regardless of the urgency of the appeal of the petitioners and the hopelessness of their situation, there
is no authority for the federal courts to usurp the power of the state legislature).
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unwarranted because the Court was presented with an alternate solution that
avoided any constitutional infractions. The imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity on the State and KCMSD would have comported with the principles of fed-
eralism and separation of powers and would have avoided establishing a
potentially pernicious precedent. In addition, this solution would have provided
a more effective enforcement mechanism, which could have increased considera-
bly the likelihood of State compliance by withholding essential federal funds.
Presented with an effective, constitutionally prudent alternative, the Jenkins
Court's imposition of an indirect judicial tax is unjustifiable.
DOUGLAS J. BROCKER
